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ABSTRACT 
Although vulnerability does not have an express legal basis in 
international human rights law, international human rights courts, 
particularly the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), have 
increasingly drawn on this concept in their jurisprudence. The ECtHR has 
developed an important line of cases concerning migrant children, whom it 
considers as particularly vulnerable to physical and mental harm during the 
migratory process. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) 
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also anchored this notion in an influential advisory opinion on the rights of 
migrant children. This article critically examines this case-law against the 
existing scholarship on vulnerability and the legal framework on human 
rights protection. It argues that the concept of vulnerability, when 
complemented by considerations of best interests of the child, can operate as 
a magnifying glass for State obligations, exposing a greater duty of 
protection and care vis-à-vis migrant children. It suggests that human rights 
courts should deploy a more substantial approach to migrant children’s 
rights based on the concept of vulnerability and on the principle of best 
interests of the child. Above all, this approach would foster stronger 
protection of these children’s rights in the long term. In addition, if effectively 
applied, it would allow human rights courts to avoid stigmatizing the most 
exposed individuals in the ongoing global migration crisis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”), the number of displaced people worldwide is currently at one 
of the highest levels ever recorded.1 Alarmingly, it is reported that more than 
one in five migrants arriving in Europe in 2015 were children.2 They are 
commonly considered to be particularly exposed to the risk of physical and 
mental abuse during the migratory process.3 
 
1  Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015 (June 20, 2016), U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES (“UNHCR”), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-
global-trends-2015.html [https://perma.cc/7X87-WVSG]; UNHCR, Over One Million Sea 
Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015 (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/5683d0b56.html 
[https://perma.cc/L5C4-RM9U]. 
2  Data Brief: Migration of Children to Europe (Nov. 30, 2015), INT’L ORG. FOR 
MIGRATION [IOM], https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/IOM-UNICEF-
Data-Brief-Refugee-and-Migrant-Crisis-in-Europe-30.11.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2FN-
GW9Y]; see also, Uprooted: The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant Children, UNICEF 
6 (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Uprooted_growing_crisis_for_refugee_and_migra
nt_children.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8T6-6CEP] (estimating that in 2016 nearly one in every 
200 children in the world was a child refugee and that the number of child refugees under the 
UNHCR’s mandate between 2005 and 2015 has more than doubled). This article uses the term 
‘children’ as defined in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“For the purposes of the present 
Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under 
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”). 
3  Uprooted: The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant Children, supra note 2, at 3; 
see also, The Refugee Crisis in Europe, UNICEF (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/Latest/Publications/The-refugee-crisis-in-Europe 
[https://perma.cc/SB2Q-CUQX]; Neither Safe Nor Sound: Unaccompanied Children on the 
Coastline of the English Channel and the North Sea, UNICEF (June 2016), 
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This is especially concerning in relation to unaccompanied or separated 
migrant children who lack adult supervision.4 Unaccompanied children are 
those individuals below the age of eighteen years “who have been separated 
from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult 
who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so.”5 Separated children are 
those who “have been separated from both parents, or from their previous 
legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other 
relatives.”6 
However, even children migrating with their parents or caregivers are not 
automatically sheltered from the risk of abuse. For instance, they may be 
exposed to harm when placed with their families in reception and detention 
centers that are not adapted to receive families.7 Accordingly, migrant 
children, accompanied or not, can be vulnerable in relation to the context and 
external environment in which they are placed. Therefore, this article focuses 
on both accompanied and unaccompanied or separated migrant children, as 
they may be equally vulnerable. 
Vulnerability is commonly understood as the state of being “[e]xposed to 
the possibility of being attacked or harmed, either physically or 
emotionally.”8 For sociologist Bryan Turner, harm is a central element since 
“[v]ulnerability defines our humanity”9 as embodied creatures who are 
 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/Latest/Publications/Neither-Safe-Nor-
Sound/[https://perma.cc/3D46-FK7D]. 
4 Unaccompanied Refugee and Migrant Children in Urgent Need of Protection, UNICEF 
(May 6, 2016), https://www.unicef.org/media/media_91069.html [https://perma.cc/F7BG-
ADNH]; Asylum applications considered to be unaccompanied minors – 2015, EUROSTAT 
(Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00194
&plugin=1 [https://perma.cc/GEZ8-T498] (indicating that 95,000 asylum applications were 
lodged by unaccompanied or separated children in Europe in 2015). 
5  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, ¶7, U.N. DOC. 
CRC/GC/2005/6 (May 17, 2005) [hereinafter Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 6]. 
6  Id. ¶ 8. 
7 Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium, App. No. 41442/07 (2010), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96825 [https://perma.cc/ZT44-V6CX] (emphasizing the 
situation of extreme stress of the mother who was unable to protect her children while in 
detention); see also MARIE-BENEDICTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS 394 
(2015) (providing a critical and insightful analysis of the ECtHR’s decision in the case of 
Muskhadzhiyeva). 
8  Vulnerable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017). 
9  BRYAN TURNER, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2006) (also presenting 
vulnerability as the common basis of human rights). 
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subjected to suffering.10 However, as deftly suggested by Professor Anna 
Grear, “vulnerability need not be conceived as a monolithic concept”11 and 
can allow for nuances and different degrees of complexity.12 Vulnerability is 
therefore universal and particular at the same time: it is universal insofar as 
it is based on the embodiment of human beings who by their very nature are 
capable of being harmed; it is also particular since it relates to the different 
contexts in which human beings can be protected from harm.13 As pointed 
out by Turner, vulnerability is our universally shared characteristic, which 
nevertheless “forces us into social dependency and social connectedness” as 
we seek protection from harm.14 
This protection is provided by different institutions, which include the 
State, the family, and the community.15 In this regard, Professor Martha 
Fineman’s definition of vulnerability as “the characteristic that positions us 
in relation to each other as human beings and also suggests a relationship of 
responsibility between state and individual”16 is markedly accurate. 
Precisely, this relationship between States and individuals is at the core of 
the development of human rights in international law.17 States are required 
to protect the vulnerable individual from harm in international human rights 
law.18 However, scholars have heavily criticized the use of the concept of 
vulnerability by suggesting that paternalistic and stigmatizing views of 
groups of individuals shift the focus from building resilience to State 
assistance.19 
 
10  See id. at 27 (discussing both physical and psychological dimensions of vulnerability 
based on suffering). 
11  ANNA GREAR, REDIRECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF CORPORATE 
LEGAL HUMANITY 128 (2010). 
12  See id. at 128. 
13  Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 
EMORY L. J. 251, 268-69 (2010-2011) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject]. 
14  TURNER, supra note 9, at 10. 
15  See id. at 28 (arguing that the creation of institutions such as family, religion, rituals, 
political institutions, serve the purpose of reducing vulnerability and providing security). 
16  Fineman, supra note 13, at 255. 
17  See OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 13 (2d ed. 2014) 
(“[H]uman rights have a logic of their own . . . [as] they have originated in domestic 
constitutional documents . . . [and as] they regulate the relationships between the State and 
individuals under their jurisdiction, rather than simply relationships between States.”). 
18  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1953) [hereinafter 
“ECHR”]; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (containing in particular the rules on 
prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment). 
19  See Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 
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The EctHR has deployed its own conception of vulnerability insofar as 
migrant children are concerned.20 Across the Atlantic, the IACtHR anchored 
this notion in an influential 2014 advisory opinion on the rights of migrant 
children.21 Both courts recognize the vulnerability of migrant children in the 
wider context of migration, taking into account the multiple risks to which 
they are particularly exposed,22 and acknowledging the implications of the 
principle of best interests of the child.23 
 
TEMPLE POL. & C.R. LAW REV. 307, 315 (2014) (“The conception of vulnerability as belonging 
only to certain groups or “populations” of people is pernicious, and distorts the nature and 
effects of legal and social problems. It can actually serve to worsen the position of those 
“populations” it seeks to protect.”); Sylvie Da Lomba, Vulnerability, Irregular Migrants’ 
Health-Related Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 21 EUR. J. HEALTH LAW 339, 
344 (2014) (arguing that group vulnerability can lead to stigmatisation of populations and to 
paternalistic approaches); Lourdes Peroni & Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable groups: The 
Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. LAW 1056, 1070 (2013) (arguing that the ECtHR’s reasoning in relation to the concept 
of vulnerability risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by essentializing, 
stigmatizing, and paternalizing them). 
20  This article has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of ECtHR’s decisions to date 
which involved migrant children (unaccompanied, separated or migrating with family 
members) and which at the same time explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability. See 
A.B. v. France, App. No. 11593/12 (2016) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165262 
[https://perma.cc/3FKM-2U8F]; Elmi and Abubakar v. Malta, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 
28151/13 (2016) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-168780 [https://perma.cc/JVJ4-C389]; 
A.M. v. France, App. No. 24587/12 (2016) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165269 
[https://perma.cc/7VY5-Z7UM]; Mahmundi v. Greece, App. No. 14902/10 (2016) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112592 [https://perma.cc/MVT4-PMZV]; R.C. v. 
France, App. No. 76491/14 (2016) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165078 
[https://perma.cc/4BTX-EL8C]; R.K. v. France, App. No. 68264/14 (2016) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165079 [https://perma.cc/8X39-MR6N]; R.M. v. France, 
App. No. 33201/11 (2016) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165261 
[https://perma.cc/WE7M-R8VX]; Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 2014-VI Eur. CT. H. R. 195 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148070 [https://perma.cc/7Y82-5G5H]; Popov v. France, 
App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07 (2012) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108710 
[https://perma.cc/4MHJ-MAC2]; Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, 55 E.H.R.R. 26 (2011) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-107895 [https://perma.cc/9R7S-Y775]; Rahimi v. 
Greece, App. No. 8687/08 (2011) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104367 
[https://perma.cc/C6WR-4FHK]; Muskhadzhiyeva, App. No. 41442/07 (2010); Mayeka v. 
Belgium, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223 (2006) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77447 
[https://perma.cc/9L4G-V5EP]. 
21  Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in need of 
International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21 
(Aug. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14]. 
22  Id. ¶ 90 (emphasizing the risks of sexual exploitation); Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 56 (condemning the “legal void” for the protection of minors held in detention centers). 
23  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 103 (proposing an 
evaluation of the best interest of the child after examination of migrant children’s 
BEDUSCHI FINAL MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2017  1:02 PM 
60 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 36:1 
This article focuses primarily on the analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR,24 using examples from the IACtHR’s jurisprudence25 as a 
comparative element supplementing the study. It argues that the concept of 
vulnerability, when complemented by considerations of best interests of the 
child, can operate as a magnifying glass for State obligations, exposing a 
greater duty of protection and care vis-à-vis migrant children. If both human 
rights courts apply this concept effectively in their future cases, it could 
achieve a substantive step-change in the protection of migrant children’s 
rights with long-term positive effects. In order to verify this argument, the 
article critically examines the use of vulnerability by the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR against the existing legal and theoretical frameworks of human 
rights protection and evaluates the implications for the effective protection 
of migrant children’s rights. 
The analysis proceeds in four consecutive steps. Firstly, the article 
examines the nature of the concept of vulnerability against the background 
of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the protection of migrant children’s rights. 
Secondly, the article evaluates the relationship between vulnerability and the 
principle of best interests of the child, assessing its advantages and limits. 
Thirdly, the article evaluates the implications of the concept of vulnerability 
for State obligations, considering whether it necessitates modifications of the 
nature or degree of these obligations in this area. Finally, the article draws 
conclusions on the effectiveness of the use of the concept of vulnerability vis-
à-vis the dangers inherent to the stigmatization of the most underprivileged 
individuals in the current context of the global migration crisis. 
II. THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY 
A. Group Dimension 
The ECtHR tends to emphasize the group dimension of the concept of 
 
vulnerability); Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109 (emphasizing the importance of the principle 
of best interest of the child). 
24  The selected ECtHR decisions observed the following criteria: in the field of Articles 
3 and 5 of the ECHR, all of the decisions involved migrant children (unaccompanied, 
separated or migrating with family members) and, at the same time, explicitly referred to the 
concept of vulnerability. In the field of Article 8 of the ECHR, all of the decisions related to 
migrant children but not always explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability (which 
allowed for the argument to be put forward that the ECtHR still has to improve the use of 
vulnerability in this area). See infra Section III.A. Decisions of the ECtHR relating to children 
(nationals) in general were also used as a point of comparison. See infra Section IV.A. 
25  The Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 is the main 
reference in this regard, as there are fewer IACtHR decisions relating to migrant children 
specifically. Decisions relating to children (including nationals) were used as a point of 
comparison insofar as they referred to the concept of vulnerability. 
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vulnerability,26 and not its individual and universal aspects.27 For instance, it 
has used this concept in a variety of situations relating to groups of people 
such as ethnic minorities,28 asylum-seekers,29 and the mentally ill.30 The 
ECtHR referred to vulnerability for the first time in the context of the 
protection of minority rights, namely when it designated the Roma minority 
as vulnerable in Chapman v. the United Kingdom.31 
Nonetheless, if the foundation of vulnerability can be situated in the 
embodied nature of all human beings,32 who by their physical constitution 
are subjected to the possibility of harm and depend upon one another,33 more 
than a few groups of people should be considered vulnerable. Vulnerability 
therefore has a universal reach,34 and the concept should be applied to all 
 
26  See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1056 (arguing that the ECtHR has deployed 
the concept of group vulnerability). 
27  See Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in 
Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW 
AND POLITICS 18, 20 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013) (“Human 
vulnerability arises in the first place from our embodiment, which carries with it the imminent 
or ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune.”); TURNER, supra note 9, at 25-26 
(arguing that every human being can be considered vulnerable). 
28  See D.H. v. the Czech Republic, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, ¶ 182 (2007) (regarding 
the vulnerability of Roma minorities). 
29  See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, ¶ 251 (2011) (regarding 
the vulnerability of asylum-seekers). See DEMBOUR, supra note 7, at 403 (providing a critical 
analysis of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece). The ECtHR has subsequently confirmed the 
vulnerability of adult asylum seekers. See Ahmed v. Malta, App. No. 55352/12, ¶ 97 (2013) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122894 [https://perma.cc/FU2G-B5H9]; Jama v. Malta, 
App. No. 10290/13, ¶ 100 (2015) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158877 
[https://perma.cc/87FG-4Y24]. 
30 See Taddei v. France, App. No. 36435/07, ¶ 63 (2010) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102440 [https://perma.cc/77BZ-GF2S] (emphasizing the 
vulnerability of the applicant, a prisoner suffering from a number of medical conditions 
including anorexia); Bamouhammad v. Belgium, App. No. 47687/13, ¶ 121 (2015) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158969 [https://perma.cc/LG8N-A4WG] (providing that 
prisoners with mental health issues are more vulnerable than ordinary prisoners). 
31  Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, ¶ 96 (2001) (affirming that the 
recognition of their vulnerability led to the imposition upon the State of an obligation to take 
into account “special considerations” in relation to their specific needs and different lifestyle 
insofar as policy-making and decision-making processes relating to them are concerned). 
32  See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 22; see TURNER, supra note 
9, at 25. See generally GREAR, supra note 11. 
33  See TURNER, supra note 9, at 26 (“Human beings are ontologically vulnerable and 
insecure, and their natural environment, doubtful. In order to protect themselves from the 
uncertainties of the everyday world, they must build social institutions . . . .”). 
34  See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 17 (2008) (“Vulnerability is universal and, as 
such, transcends historic categories of impermissible discrimination.”). 
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human beings. However, as affirmed by Fineman, “while human 
vulnerability is universal, constant, and complex, it is also particular. While 
all human beings stand in a position of constant vulnerability, we are 
individually positioned differently.”35 Some individuals may be better 
sheltered from harm as they may receive protection from their families, 
communities, and State, whereas other individuals may not receive the same 
degree of protection.36 The assertion that some groups of people can be more 
vulnerable than others can only be accepted as a starting point. The analysis 
of the context in which the individuals evolve, and their particularities vis-à-
vis the groups to which they belong, should also be taken into account. 
In the case of the protection of migrant children’s rights, vulnerability 
encompasses aspects linked to the fragile nature of all human beings and it 
equally relates to the children’s belonging to one or more social groups. The 
ECtHR has emphasized that migrant children are in an extremely vulnerable 
situation as they are not only minors, but also aliens in an irregular situation 
in a foreign country who are not always accompanied by an adult.37 This is 
certainly a positive step towards a more holistic approach to recognizing risks 
inherent in child migration. 
Additionally, the ECtHR should also consider gender, as unaccompanied 
or separated girls are generally considered more vulnerable to sexual 
exploitation and abuses when migrating on their own.38 Disability is another 
important concern that should be taken into account by the Court, as migrant 
children with disabilities are more frequently exposed to abuse, exploitation 
and neglect.39 Trauma, stress, and mental health issues are additional 
considerations that should be taken into account.40 These are all elements 
 
35  Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 268-69. 
36  See TURNER, supra note 9, at 26 (discussing the dependency upon institutions and their 
precariousness). 
37  See e.g., Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, (EUR. CT. H.R., 2012) ¶ 91; 
Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08 (EUR. Ct. H.R., 2011) ¶ 87; Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 
103. 
38  See Hans van de Glind, Migration and Child Labour: Exploring Child Migrant 
Vulnerabilities and Those of Children Left-Behind 9, ILO (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=14313 
[https://perma.cc/A2ZA-UHTS] (arguing that girls are especially susceptible to sexual abuse 
during the migratory process). 
39  See Rachel Reilly, Disabilities among Refugees and Conflict-Affected Populations, 35 
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 8 (2010). 
40  The ECtHR takes into account the stress and anxiety that detention causes in migrant 
children which may be considered as inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the 
ECHR. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 3; Tarakhel, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, ¶ 119; 
Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 58; see also Mina Fazel et. al., Mental Health of 
Displaced and Refugee Children Resettled in High-Income Countries: Risk and Protective 
Factors, 379 LANCET 266, 279 (2012) (“Evidence lends support to the idea of spirals of loss 
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that, when combined, lead to a situation of extreme vulnerability. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that we can speak of a composite form of 
vulnerability41 whenever two or more of these elements are present at the 
same time.42 However, composite vulnerability should not be understood as 
cumulative in nature. It should not be misused and misunderstood as a simple 
tick-box exercise, with individuals who do not meet the requisite number of 
criteria excluded from protection.43 On the contrary, composite vulnerability 
should allow for a particularized view of migrant children’s concrete 
situations. 
In comparison, although the IACtHR strongly relates to identifiable groups 
of individuals, it also takes into account their particular situation within the 
group and their relationship with individuals and institutions outside the 
group. In the case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the 
IACtHR recognized the vulnerability of certain indigenous communities, 
notably, when its members were not legally registered in the State’s official 
records.44 However, it is interesting to note that the IACtHR emphasized the 
existence of especially vulnerable groups within this indigenous community 
while assessing “the actual risk and vulnerability situation to which the 
members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community are exposed, especially children, 
pregnant women and the elderly.”45 It follows that in Sawhoyamaxa certain 
categories of people were deemed to experience an additional aspect of 
 
drawing attention to the way many challenges affect refugees at all stages of their journeys.”). 
41  The term compounded vulnerability has also been used by scholars in a broader 
context relating to other groups of people and not only migrant children. See Alexandra 
Timmer, A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights, in 
VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS, supra 
note 27, at 161; Ulrik Brandl & Philip Czech, General and Specific Vulnerability of 
Protection-Seekers in the EU: Is there an Adequate Response to their Needs?, in PROTECTING 
VULNERABLE GROUPS. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 247, 251 (Francesca 
Ippolito & Sara Iglesias Sanchez eds., 2015). 
42  For the purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that the Human Rights 
Committee has also recognised the “special vulnerability of certain categories of person, 
including in particular children” which should be taken into account by States while ensuring 
that individuals have accessible and effective remedies. See Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, ¶ 15, U.N. DOC. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004). 
43  See Aoife O’Higgins, Vulnerability and Agency: Beyond an Irreconcilable Dichotomy 
for Social Service Providers Working with Young Refugees in the UK, in INDEPENDENT CHILD 
MIGRATION – INSIGHTS INTO AGENCY, VULNERABILITY, AND STRUCTURE 79, 85 (Aida Orgocka 
& Christina Clark-Kazak eds., 2012) (“[W]here young people did not conform to expectations 
of vulnerability deemed appropriate for a refugee child, they risked being denied the support 
they needed.”). 
44  Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 189-91 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
45  Id. ¶ 159. 
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vulnerability, as they not only belonged to the indigenous community and 
were therefore socially and economically excluded, but they were also 
children, pregnant women, or elderly. 
Furthermore, in the case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican 
Republic, the IACtHR specifically considered that “the State must pay 
special attention to the needs and the rights of the alleged victims owing to 
their condition as girl children, who belong to a vulnerable group.”46 The 
composite nature of the victims’ vulnerability is apparent in this case, as they 
were not only children, but also girls, and were discriminated in relation to 
their origins (Dominicans of Haitian descent).47 In its Advisory Opinion OC-
21, the IACtHR emphasized the “situation of additional vulnerability”48 in 
which migrant children often find themselves, entailing an “increased risk of 
violation of their rights.”49 
Therefore, any finding of group vulnerability must be complemented by a 
close contextual analysis of the situation of the individuals vis-à-vis their 
places in the different social groups. The next section examines how regional 
human rights courts have undertaken this type of analysis in their 
jurisprudence. 
B. Contextual Analysis 
Despite maintaining a group dimension for its understanding of the 
concept of vulnerability, the ECtHR also takes into account the particular 
aspects of the situation of individual migrant children. In doing so, it 
undertakes a contextual analysis of their individual cases.50 In this regard, 
Professors Peroni and Timmer have proposed a helpful general analytical 
framework.51 They suggest that the concept of vulnerability as exposed by 
the ECtHR is “relational, particular, and harm-based.”52 This framework can 
serve as a basis for verifying how vulnerability is applied to the specific 
context of the protection of migrant children’s rights in three main ways. 
 
46  Yean v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶ 134 (Sept. 8, 2005) (relating to the denial of 
nationality to Dominicans of Haitian descent by the Dominican authorities). 
47  Id. ¶¶ 109(9), 134. 
48  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 71. 
49  Id. 
50  This is the case in all decisions involving migrant children in which the ECtHR 
explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability. See Elmi, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, 
¶ 113; Tarahkel, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, ¶¶ 116-22; Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 
39474/07, ¶102; Muskhadzhiyeva, App. No. 41442/07, ¶ 63; Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 26 ¶¶ 64-68; Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109; Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 
103. 
51  See generally Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19. 
52  Id. at 1064. 
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Firstly, Peroni and Timmer contend that vulnerability can be seen as 
relational insofar as it is “shaped by social, historical, and institutional 
forces.”53 The individual is therefore placed in a context, the one of 
relationships within his or her group. In the case of migrant children’s 
vulnerability, this aspect can be seen in the treatment of the vulnerability of 
the child as an axiom by the ECtHR.54 The Court considers that children are 
automatically vulnerable in their relationship with adults. The same type of 
approach has been taken by the IACtHR.55 This is also the perception of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (“the Committee”).56 Therefore, the 
ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the Committee all acknowledge that children are 
per se more vulnerable than adults to the abuse of their rights.57 
 
53  Id. 
54  See Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, ¶ 91 (“[I]t is important to bear in mind 
that the child’s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over 
considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant.”). 
55  See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 159 
(indicating the risks incurred by certain categories of indigenous populations, and in particular 
their children). 
56  See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶ 4 
(arguing that these children are particularly vulnerable); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No. 8: The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and 
Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment (Arts. 19; 28, Para. 2; and 37, inter alia), ¶ 
21, U.N. DOC. CRC/C/GC/8 (May 15, 2006) (emphasizing the vulnerability of children in 
general); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14: The Right of the Child 
to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (Art. 3, Para. 1), ¶ 54, 
U.N. DOC. CRC/C/GC/14 (Jan. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No. 14] (“The fact that the child is very young or in a vulnerable situation 
(e.g. has a disability, belongs to a minority group, is a migrant, etc.) does not deprive him or 
her of the right to express his or her views, nor reduces the weight given to the child’s views 
in determining his or her best interests.”); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 15: The Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (Art. 24), ¶ 8, U.N. DOC. CRC/C/GC/15 (Jan. 14, 2013) (arguing that discrimination 
is a significant factor contributing to children’s vulnerability); Comm. on the Rights of the 
Child, General Comment No. 16: State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the Business 
Sector on Children’s Rights, ¶ 31, U.N. DOC. CRC/C/GC/16 (Jan. 14, 2013) (“[C]hildren can 
be more vulnerable to the effects of abuse of their rights than adults and that the effects can be 
irreversible and result in lifelong damage.”); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Draft General 
Comment on the Implementation of the Rights of the Child During Adolescence, ¶ 2, U.N. 
DOC. CRC/C/GC/20 (Apr. 22, 2016) (emphasizing the significant vulnerability of children at 
that period of their lives). See also Kristen Sandberg, The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the Vulnerability of Children, 84 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 221, 222 (2015) (“Using 
society’s institutions to build resilience is one of the main ideas of the vulnerability theory, 
which should not lead to paternalism but rather might add to the understanding and application 
of the Convention, with the potential to strengthen its implementation.”). 
57  See Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of the Child 
Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 131, 139 (2006) 
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However, it is submitted that this position should be nuanced, as children 
do not constitute a homogeneous group. Research demonstrates that 
children’s cognitive development evolves with age and so does their capacity 
to adapt and to become more resilient to external factors.58 Moreover, if taken 
out of context, this aspect of the recognition of vulnerability can be highly 
problematic. It may indeed reinforce the assumption that all children are not 
fully capable beings and excessively emphasize their dependency on adults. 
In this regard, recognition of vulnerability should not exclude agency.59 In 
addition, migrant children’s vulnerability also relates to other aspects, such 
as their gender, disability, mental health, and condition as migrants.60 
Accordingly, all of these elements should be taken into consideration where 
migrant children are concerned. 
Secondly, the concept of vulnerability is arguably particular, insofar as the 
“vulnerability is shaped by specific group-based experiences.”61 The ECtHR 
takes into account the particular experiences that migrant children may have 
had within their vulnerable group. A case in point is Popov v. France, which 
concerned the detention of a couple from Kazakhstan who was facing 
deportation with their two children, aged five months and three years, 
 
(arguing that taking into account the unique situation of vulnerability of unaccompanied 
minors, by not distinguishing unaccompanied minors from adults, the law gives no 
consideration to children’s unique difficulties in satisfying the same legal standards); John 
Tobin, Understanding Children’s Rights: A Vision beyond Vulnerability, 84 NORDIC J. INT’L 
L. 155, 166 (2015) (“[Children have] special vulnerabilities, which accord with the lived 
experiences of children, provide a basis for the special rights which children enjoy under the 
CRC.”). 
58  See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development during 
Childhood through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8174, 8178 (2004) 
(finding that children’s brains develop in a specific pattern and growth has a consequence for 
behaviour and neurodevelopmental disorders); Rachel Keen, The Development of Problem 
Solving in Young Children: A Critical Cognitive Skill, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (2011) 
(discussing children’s skills according to their age and stage of cognitive development); Mina 
Fazel & Alan Stein, The Mental Health of Refugee Children, 87 ARCHIVE DISEASE CHILD. 366, 
367 (2002) (“Traumatic events can have an effect on a child’s emotional, cognitive, and moral 
development because they influence the child’s self perceptions [sic] and expectations of 
others.”). 
59  Agency is defined by O’Higgins as “young people’s ability to participate meaningfully 
in the construction of their daily lives, including their capacity to cope, their ability to adapt, 
and their resilience.” See O’Higgins, supra note 43, at 81. 
60  INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
12 (2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/WHO_IOM_UNOHCHRPublication.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2A2Q-LQN6]. 
61  Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1064. Material deprivation of unaccompanied 
children has also been considered by the ECtHR. Rahimi, App. No. 8687/09, ¶ 87. 
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respectively.62 The ECtHR affirmed that the migrant children concerned had 
been in a situation of particular vulnerability, heightened by the conditions 
of detention.63 
Likewise, in Elmi v. Malta, the ECtHR held that the applicants who were 
aged sixteen and seventeen years old “were particularly vulnerable because 
of everything they had been through during their migration and the traumatic 
experiences they were likely to have endured previously.”64 Furthermore, it 
admitted that they “were even more vulnerable than any other adult asylum 
seeker detained at the time because of their age.”65 By doing so, the ECtHR 
maintained its axiomatic view that children are per se more vulnerable than 
adults, but also took into consideration the risks related to the migratory 
context.66 Accordingly, this approach allows for a more in concreto analysis 
of the situation of the migrant children which can outweigh the negative 
effects of the use of the concept of vulnerability. 
Thirdly, it is posited that the concept can be seen as harm-based. The 
ECtHR situates harm—including physical, mental and sexual abuse, social 
disadvantage, and material deprivation—at the center of its understanding of 
vulnerability.67 Harm is therefore assessed in light of the relevant context and 
potential external risk. For instance, in relation to the situation of migrant 
children, the external risk of harm appears to be at the heart of the 
development of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.68 
Accordingly, in Musknadzhiyeva v. Belgium, the ECtHR concluded that 
the detention of four children, aged respectively seven months, three and a 
half years, five years, and seven years, in a closed detention center primarily 
designed for adults was unlawful, despite the fact that they were not separated 
from their mother.69 The conditions of their detention were deemed 
detrimental to their mental health.70 Likewise, in V.M. v. Belgium, the ECtHR 
took into account the possibility of harm due to the situation of vulnerability 
of the applicants, a family of Roma origin with five children (including a 
 
62  Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, ¶ 91. 
63  Id. ¶ 102. 
64  Elmi, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, ¶ 113. 
65  Id. 
66  Conversely, in Jama v. Malta, the ECtHR considered that the applicant who was found 
to be an adult following age determination proceedings “was not more vulnerable than any 
other adult asylum seeker detained at the time” even though she “was particularly vulnerable 
because of everything she had been through during her migration and the traumatic 
experiences she was likely to have endured previously.” Jama v. Malta, App. No. 10290/13, ¶ 
100 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158877 [https://perma.cc/FU2G-B5H9]. 
67  Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1064. 
68  Id. 
69  Muskhadzhiyeva, App. No. 41442/07, ¶¶ 59-63. 
70  Id. 
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baby and a handicapped child).71 The ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) (prohibition of 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) in relation to the deplorable 
conditions in which they were forced to live between their removal from the 
detention center and their expulsion to Serbia.72 Similarly, in Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland, the ECtHR emphasized the lack of sufficient assurances that, if 
returned to Italy, the applicant’s family, which included six minor children, 
would be taken care of in a manner adapted to the ages of the children.73 
The IACtHR has adopted a similar approach in its Advisory Opinion OC-
21.74 It clearly emphasized the risks of harm to which migrant children are 
exposed while migrating and directly referred to General Comment No. 6 of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child.75 In particular, these risks relate to 
threats to their life, freedom, security, or personal integrity.76 The contextual 
analysis of their situation allows for a better understanding of their harm-
based vulnerability. 
Academic scholarship has drawn attention to the potential dangers posed 
by the concept of vulnerability.77 If not assessed adequately, it can give way 
to adverse outcomes. On the one hand, it can lead to the stigmatization of 
already vulnerable groups.78 On the other hand, it may lead to the over-
generalization of the concept, one that presumes all members of a group are 
equally vulnerable. However, in the specific context of the protection of 
migrant children’s rights, judicial recognition of their vulnerability can 
arguably lead to improved consideration of their specific needs. By 
identifying the particularities of these children’s situations, courts can avoid 
stigmatizing them as a vulnerable group.79 In addition, if their vulnerabilities 
relate to a particular situation and are not seen as inherent to their condition 
of children, harm can be more easily prevented.80 For instance, physical and 
psychological harm can be avoided if States agree that unaccompanied 
 
71  V.M. v. Belgium, App. No. 60125/11, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14, ¶¶ 6-8 (2015), appeal 
dismissed, 65 Eur. H.R. Rep., 14 (2017). 
72  Id. ¶¶ 162-63. 
73  Tarakhel, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, ¶ 121. 
74  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 90 (referring 
particularly to risks of harm incurred by unaccompanied or separated migrant children). 
75  See id.; Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶ 
23 (outlining the risks of harm that migrant children incur while on the move). 
76  See Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 90. 
77  See supra text accompanying note 19. 
78  See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1070 (arguing that the ECtHR’s reasoning in 
relation to the concept of vulnerability risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by 
essentializing, stigmatizing, and paternalizing them). 
79  See id. at 1073. 
80  See id. at 1073-74. 
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minors and families with children should not be placed in detention facilities 
that are not adapted to receive them. 
Accordingly, if regional human right courts are able to take into account 
the particularities of the situation of migrant children,81 it is possible to argue 
that the use of the concept of vulnerability can have a positive impact on the 
protection of their fundamental rights. The ECtHR takes into account the 
different elements relating to the migrant child’s personal history and state of 
physical and mental health, the environment in which they develop, and the 
risk of abuses they face while on the move and once in the country of 
destination.82 By doing so, it imposes a multi-layered analysis of their 
vulnerability according to these different elements. However, these layers 
should not be understood as cumulative, since composite vulnerability should 
not be misused and transformed into an exclusionary tool. 
Instead, composite vulnerability should be used as a tool to include a wider 
range of migrant children under protection and to inform better decision-
making. By situating vulnerability into the specific context of migrant 
children’s experiences, the ECtHR is directing its jurisprudence towards a 
more inclusive framework of protection of migrant children’s rights. This is 
highly encouraging,83 especially given that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can 
have persuasive authority and can lead to a form of judicial dialogue with 
domestic courts.84 For instance, it is interesting to note the U.K. Upper 
 
81  See WOUTER VANDENHOLE & JULIE RYNGAERT, Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in 
Migration Litigation: Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR 68, 72 (Eva Brems ed., 2013) (arguing 
that three factors determine vulnerability—personal, environmental, and risk—and that the 
degree of vulnerability and agency depends on the interaction between these different factors). 
82  See Elmi, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, ¶ 113; Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 
39474/07, ¶¶ 101-02; Muskhadzhiyeva, App. No. 41442/07 ¶ 61; Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 223, ¶ 55. 
83  But see MARC BOSSUYT, Is the European Court of Human Rights on a Slippery Slope?, 
in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO 
STRENGTH 27, 30 (Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart & Julie Fraser eds., 2013) (expressing strong 
criticism about the ECtHR’s jurisprudence recognizing the vulnerability of asylum seekers). 
84  See Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 515 (2000) 
(presenting a critical evaluation of the meaning and significance of the citation of judgments 
from other jurisdictions by domestic courts in the field of the protection of constitutional 
rights); MICHAL BOBEK, COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS (2013) 
(analyzing cross-border judicial dialogue in Europe); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Judicial 
Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation, in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY 
DOMESTIC COURTS: UNIFORMITY, DIVERSITY, CONVERGENCE 72, 72 (Helmut Philipp Aust & 
Georg Nolte eds., 2016) (arguing that international law requires domestic jurisdictions to 
engage in a sort of judicial dialogue by considering decisions of other jurisdictions); Frédéric 
Sudre, À propos du ‘dialogue des juges’ et du contrôle de conventionnalité, in LES 
DYNAMIQUES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN EN DÉBUT DE SIÈCLE : ÉTUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-
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Tribunal’s recent decision ordering the family reunification of three Syrian 
minors and one Syrian mentally disabled adult, who were living in an 
improvised refugee camp (also known as “the jungle”) in Calais, France.85 
The resemblance with the general line of ECtHR’s jurisprudence related to 
composite vulnerability of migrant children is remarkable. The U.K. Upper 
Tribunal’s decision emphasized the applicants’ “special, indeed unique, 
situation because of their ages, their vulnerability, their psychologically 
traumatized condition, the acute and ever present dangers to which they are 
exposed in ‘the jungle’, [and] the mental disability of [one of the 
applicants].”86 Based on their vulnerability and considerations of the best 
interests of the children, the judges decided that to refuse the admission of 
the applicants to the U.K. would disproportionately interfere with their right 
to respect for family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.87 The Upper Tribunal 
thus took into account the specific situation of the applicants, while expressly 
acknowledging their group vulnerability. Although this decision was later 
overturned on appeal,88 the Court of Appeal similarly recognized the 
importance of the vulnerability inherent in the situation of unaccompanied 
migrant children.89 
Overall, the official acknowledgment of the composite vulnerability of 
migrant children promotes awareness of the necessity to adequately protect 
their rights. Specific consideration of the principle of best interests of the 
child can further reinforce this necessity, as will be shown in the next section. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VULNERABILITY AND BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD 
A. Complementarity 
According to Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”), the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all 
actions concerning children.90 This principle provides a normative 
 
CLAUDE GAUTRON 207, 210 (Joël Andriantsimbazovina et al., eds., 2004) (discussing the 
existence of a judicial dialogue in relation to the application of the ECHR by domestic courts). 
85  ZAT v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2015] 6 JR 15405 [17] (U.K.). 
86  Id. ¶ 6. 
87  Id. ¶ 58. 
88  Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. ZAT [2016] EWCA (Civ) 810 [8], [2016] WLR 
(D) 452 (U.K.). 
89  Id. ¶ 84 (per L.J. Beatson) (“The need for expedition in cases involving particularly 
vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied children is recognised . . . Delay to family 
reunification may in itself be an interference with rights under ECHR Article 8 . . . .”). 
90  Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, art. 3. The best interest principle 
is also provided by Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. See Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of European Union, art. 24, 2000 J.O. (C 364) 1. The Court of Justice 
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framework for the definition and interpretation of the rights of the child.91 
The ECtHR tends to combine the concept of vulnerability with the principle 
of the best interests of the child when deciding on issues relating to the 
protection of migrant children’s rights.92 The principle of best interests of the 
child can indeed be a valuable complement to the concept of vulnerability. 
It is commonly accepted that it is in a child’s best interests, for instance, to 
acquire a nationality and have her birth registered,93 to receive adequate 
education,94 to have her application for family reunification dealt with by 
States “in a positive, humane and expeditious manner,”95 to receive adequate 
protection against all forms of physical and mental violence or abuse,96 and 
not to be arbitrarily separated from her parents or caretakers.97 These 
considerations also apply to unaccompanied or separated migrant children,98 
including in relation to conditions of reception, treatment, and access to basic 
rights in countries of transit and destination.99 The best interests of the child 
principle therefore creates an additional layer of protection, complementing 
the general protection offered by regional human rights treaties.100 
 
of the European Union (“CJEU”) considers the CRC when applying general principles of EU 
law. See Case C-540/03 Eur. Parl. v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-05769, ¶ 37. 
91  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14, supra note 56, ¶ 6 
(recognizing that the child’s best interests is a threefold concept: a substantive right, an 
interpretative legal principle, and a rule of procedure). 
92  Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶ 67. 
93  See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 7. The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child is one of the most widely ratified treaties with 196 parties to the 
convention. 
94  Id. art. 28. 
95  Id. art. 10. 
96  Id. arts. 19, 32, 34-36. 
97  Id. art. 9. 
98  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶¶ 7-8. 
99  See Guidelines on Formal Determination of the Best Interests of the Child, UNHCR 
14 (2008), http://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQB8-YDX9] (defining 
the term best interests as broadly describing the well-being of a child); Inter-Agency Guiding 
Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children, UNHCR 16 (2004), 
http://www.unhcr.org/4098b3172.html [https://perma.cc/5TT4-9KUH] (considering the 
principle of best interests of the child as the basic standard for guiding decisions and actions 
taken to help children, whether by national or international organizations, courts of law, 
administrative authorities, or legislative bodies). 
100  See JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
183 (2006) (affirming that the consideration of best interests of the child constitutes a 
complementary ground of protection vis-à-vis the Refugee Convention); Jason M. Pobjoy, The 
Best Interests of the Child Principle as an Independent Source of International Protection, 64 
INT’L COMP. L. Q. 327, 344 (2015) (arguing that the best interests principle may give rise to 
an independent protection status in international law); see also, in the context of deportation 
of foreigners, Üner v. Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99, ¶ 58 (2006), 
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By way of an illustrative example, in Rahimi v. Greece, the ECtHR 
acknowledged the situation of extreme vulnerability of the applicant, an 
unaccompanied migrant boy from Afghanistan who was detained for two 
days upon arrival in Greece and subsequently abandoned to live on the 
streets.101 The Court found a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation 
to the deplorable conditions of his detention and the lack of care by public 
authorities, notably in light of his vulnerability.102 However, the Court’s 
finding of a violation of Article 5(1)103 was particularly based on the Greek 
authorities’ lack of consideration of the best interests of the child 
applicant.104 Taking into account the vulnerability of the applicant, the 
ECtHR indicated that the Greek authorities could not be deemed to have 
acted in good faith,105 as they did not consider the child’s best interests while 
deciding on his detention.106 In Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, a decision relating 
to the detention conditions of a mother and three children of Sri Lankan Tamil 
origins who had claimed asylum in Belgium,107 the ECtHR recognized the 
vulnerability of the children and also emphasized the importance of the best 
interests of the child principle.108 It is submitted that by referring and drawing 
upon both the concept of vulnerability and the principle of best interests of 
the child, the ECtHR advances the complementarity of the two notions. 
 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77542 [https://perma.cc/G6FY-JKLB] (affirming that 
consideration should be given to the best interests and well-being of the children, especially 
the gravity of the difficulties which any children of the applicant may encounter in the country 
to which the applicant is to be expelled). 
101  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶¶ 86-87. 
102  Id. ¶ 95. 
103  See ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 5(1)(f). (“Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: . . . f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”). 
104  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109. 
105  The ECtHR has established that detention of a foreigner is not arbitrary only insofar 
as it meets the four conditions established in Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 
74 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84709 [https://perma.cc/D567-RWZM] (“To 
avoid being branded as arbitrary, therefore, such detention must be carried out in good faith; 
it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to 
the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that 
‘the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens 
who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country’; and the length of the 
detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.”) (internal 
citation omitted). The same conditions also apply for detention for the purpose of removal. Id. 
¶ 73. 
106  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109. 
107  Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26. 
108  Id. ¶ 67. 
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This approach is certainly not without its flaws, and several of these 
deficiencies ought to be highlighted. Firstly, the ECtHR did not go as far as 
imposing a ban on detention of migrant children,109 whereas evidence 
demonstrates its negative effects on their long-term psychological health.110 
Secondly, in Rahimi, the ECtHR imported the principle of best interests of 
the child from the realm of the CRC, but did not provide a comprehensive 
definition of its scope or the specific obligations required from States.111 
Finally, although it expressly cited Article 3 of the CRC in the 
abovementioned decisions,112 the ECtHR failed to refer to the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6, which specifically relates 
to the treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their 
country of origin.113 In doing so, the ECtHR overlooked the definition of the 
determination of best interests adopted by the Committee,114 possibly in an 
attempt to avoid being bound by the Committee’s stronger child-centered 
views on detention of migrant children.115 This dissociation from the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s position on detention is confirmed 
by the ECtHR’s ruling in Elmi.116 In this decision, the ECtHR did finally 
explicitly refer to the General Comment No. 6,117 but it did not in fact use the 
principle of best interests in its assessment of the lawfulness and non-
 
109  See DEMBOUR, supra note 7, at 394 (“[A] blanket condemnation of children’s 
detention when the said children are not ‘unaccompanied’ is conspicuous by its absence.”). 
110  See Michael Dudley et al., Children and Young People in Immigration Detention, 25 
CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 285, 286, 289 (2012); MARY BOSWORTH, INSIDE IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION 199 (2014); Aamer Sultan & Kevin O’Sullivan, Psychological Disturbances in 
Asylum Seekers Held in Long Term Detention: A Participant-Observer Account, 175 MED. J. 
AUSTL. 593, 593-96 (2001); Ann Lorek et al., The Mental and Physical Health Difficulties of 
Children Held within a British Immigration Detention Center: A Pilot Study, 33 CHILD ABUSE 
& NEGLECT 573, 581 (2009); Louise Newman & Zachary Steel, The Child Asylum Seeker: 
Psychological and Developmental Impact of Immigration Detention, 17 CHILD ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS NORTH AMERICA 665, 665-83 (2008). 
111  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 33. 
112  Id. ¶ 108; Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶ 67. 
113  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶ 5. 
114  Id. ¶ 20 (“[A] determination of what is in the best interests of the child requires a clear 
and comprehensive assessment of the child’s identity, including her or his nationality, 
upbringing, ethnic, cultural and linguistic background, particular vulnerabilities and protection 
needs. Consequently, allowing the child access to the territory is a prerequisite to this initial 
assessment process. The assessment process should be carried out in a friendly and safe 
atmosphere by qualified professionals who are trained in age and gender sensitive related 
interviewing techniques.”). 
115  Id. ¶ 61 (“Detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being 
unaccompanied or separated, or on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof.”). 
116  Elmi, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13. 
117  Id. ¶ 56. 
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arbitrariness of the detention of the applicants.118 By contrast, the IACtHR’s 
approach is closer to the one adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child in its General Comment No. 6 regarding detention and the best interests 
of the child. This can be seen in the fact that, in addition to citing the General 
Comment in its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the IACtHR has also directly 
drawn upon it.119 
In relation to Article 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for private and family 
life), the ECtHR’s recourse to the concept of vulnerability is comparatively 
less well developed than that of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR.120 In contrast, 
the references to the child’s best interests are quite significant.121 For 
example, the ECtHR takes into account several factors, including age, rupture 
of family life, ties to the host country, immigration control, and 
considerations of public order, to determine whether it is in the child’s best 
interests not to be removed.122 Accordingly, achieving a fair balance between 
competing interests of States and individuals is at the center of its 
jurisprudence.123 On the one hand, States have the right to control the entry 
of non-nationals into their territories and family reunion is not automatically 
guaranteed under Article 8.124 On the other hand, the particular 
circumstances of the case and the child’s best interests have been taken into 
account by the Court.125 Still, these particular circumstances could and 
should also include the migrant children’s vulnerability. The ECtHR should 
expressly build this notion into its evaluation of the specific circumstances of 
 
118  Id. ¶¶ 140-48. The applicants were detained for eight months after having claimed 
asylum while their age was determined by the competent authorities. The ECtHR found that 
there was a violation of Article 5(1) of the ECHR after considering the four conditions 
established in Saadi, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 74. However, it did not explicitly consider the best 
interests of the child while assessing the authorities’ good faith and the length of detention 
imposed on the applicants. 
119  See Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 155. 
120  See ECHR, supra note 18, at arts. 3, 5 & 8. 
121  See Nunez v. Norway, App. No. 55597/09, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, ¶¶ 78-84 (2011) 
(analyzing the considerations relating to the children’s best interests regarding the fair balance 
test under Article 8 of the ECHR). 
122  See id. ¶ 70; Ajayi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27663/95, ¶ 2 (1999); Solomon v. 
Netherlands, App. No. 44328/98, ¶ 1 (2000); Rodrigues v. Netherlands, App. No. 50435/99, 
2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 235, ¶ 39 (2006). 
123  See Nunez, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, ¶¶ 78-84. See also Ciara Smyth, The Best Interests 
of the Child in the Expulsion and First-Entry Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: How Principled is the Court’s Use of the Principle?, 17 EUR. J. MIGRATION L. 70, 103 
(2015) (“[T]he Court does not generally ground its reasoning in a rights-based approach.”). 
124  Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, 7 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 471, ¶ 67 (1985). 
125  See Nunez, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, ¶¶ 70, 78; Rodrigues, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 235, ¶¶ 
39, 44. 
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each case involving migrant children. 
Comparatively, the IACtHR proposes a clearer double-layered test to 
determine the nature and scope of special measures for the protection of 
migrant children required from States. Firstly, it requires the domestic 
authorities to evaluate different factors that may result in the recognition of 
vulnerability. Secondly, it expects these authorities to analyze whether these 
measures were taken in the best interests of the children.126 Thus, the sole 
test of best interests would not suffice to determine the nature and the extent 
of the measures necessary for the protection of the migrant children. For 
instance, the IACtHR suggested that unaccompanied or separated migrant 
girls are particularly vulnerable due to higher risks of sexual exploitation and 
abuses.127 In this sense, domestic authorities should first take into account 
the children’s particular situation of vulnerability, and then consider what 
would be in their best interests in order to adopt the most appropriate 
measures.128 
Drawing upon the abovementioned examples, it appears that the ECtHR 
tends to rely upon the concept of vulnerability to emphasize the need for 
special measures of protection of migrant children. This is particularly 
prominent in the context of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR.129 In addition, the 
principle of best interests of the child complements and reinforces the request 
for special measures, notably in the ambit of Article 3. By referring to the 
principle of best interests of the child, the ECtHR locates these special 
measures within a broader regulatory framework, making it easier to 
determine whether a substantive right has been violated or not by domestic 
authorities. In contrast, the IACtHR embraces a more comprehensive child 
rights-based approach that emphasizes considerations of the welfare of 
migrant children.130 
It is submitted that the complementary use of the concept of vulnerability 
and the principle of best interests of the child should be welcomed, as it can 
pave the way towards a more robust and effective implementation of special 
measures of protection and assistance for migrant children.131 The 
assessment of the vulnerability of the situation of these children coupled with 
the consideration of their best interests as a guiding principle could require, 
for instance, that States provide more adequate assistance to unaccompanied 
 
126  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 104. 
127  Id. ¶ 102. 
128  Id. ¶ 103. 
129  See ECHR, supra note 18, at arts. 3, 5. 
130  See Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, operative ¶ 2. 
131  See Jane McAdam, Seeking Asylum under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
A Case for Complementary Protection, 14 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 251, 251 (2006) (“[T]he 
best interests of the child, reflecting an absolute principle of international law, are highly 
relevant in determining whether or not a child needs international protection.”). 
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migrant children while in makeshift camps,132 or while placed in offshore 
detention facilities.133 However, this complementarity should not be 
undermined by the instrumentalization of the principle of best interests of the 
child, as will be exposed in the next section. 
B. Instrumentalization 
The analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence demonstrates that the principle 
of best interests of the child can be a powerful tool in finding breaches of 
protected rights. For instance, this approach was adopted by the ECtHR in 
Rahimi.134 It was the procedural flaw in the appreciation of the best interests 
of the child by the Greek authorities that reinforced the finding of a violation 
of Article 5(1) of the ECHR in this decision, not the sole fact of detention of 
a vulnerable migrant child.135 Conversely, in Kanagaratnam, the ECtHR 
found a breach of Article 5(1) insofar as the children were concerned.136 The 
vulnerability of the children was paramount for the Court in reaching its 
verdict.137 Without further developing its arguments, the ECtHR simply 
referred138 to a passage in its previous ruling in Mayeka v. Belgium, where 
the situation of extreme vulnerability of unaccompanied migrant children 
was explicitly acknowledged.139 The ECtHR then applied the same findings 
to situations of detention of children, this time accompanied by their parents, 
referring to its decision in Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium140 and finding a 
violation of Article 5(1).141 
Conceivably, the principle of best interests of the child was less prominent 
in Kanagaratnam because the detention had lasted for approximately four 
months in a closed detention center, which had already been judged to be 
 
132  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations Regarding France, ¶ 75, 
U.N. DOC. CRC/C/FRA/CO/5 (Jan. 29, 2016) (expressing concern about the uncertainty 
surrounding children and their families in refugee camps, such as in Calais and in Grande-
Synthe, in the northern part of the state). 
133  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations Regarding Australia, ¶ 
31, U.N. DOC. CRC/C/AUS/CO/4 (May 29, 2012) (expressing concerns about the inadequate 
understanding and application of the principle of the best interests of the child in situations 
such as asylum-seeking, refugee and/or immigration detention). 
134  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109. 
135  Id. 
136  Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶¶ 86, 88. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. ¶ 86. 
139  Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 103. 
140  Muskhadzhiyeva, App. No. 41442/07, ¶ 61. 
141  See Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶¶ 86-88; see also Vandenhole & Ryngaert, 
supra note 81, at 68 (providing a comprehensive commentary of Muskhadzhiyeva). 
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inappropriate for the needs of children.142 Taking into account their 
vulnerability, the Court considered that by placing the children (despite being 
accompanied by their mother) in such a closed center, the Belgian authorities 
had exposed them to feelings of anxiety and inferiority and had, in full 
knowledge of the facts, risked compromising their development.143 The 
ECtHR could therefore find a violation of Articles 3 and 5(1) of the ECHR 
without overly relying on the application of the principle of best interests of 
the child.144  The same approach was visible in Elmi, where the detention of 
the applicants for the purpose of determining their age lasted eight months.145 
Despite explicitly referring to Article 3 of the CRC146 and to the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6,147 the ECtHR did not 
in fact make use of the principle of best interests of the child when finding 
violations of Articles 3 and 5(1) of the ECHR.148 By contrast, in Rahimi, the 
detention had lasted only two days and the ECtHR relied heavily on the best 
interests principle in order to legitimatize the overall finding of a violation of 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR.149 
Therefore, the ECtHR appears to instrumentalize the principle of best 
interests, only using it when convenient for finding violations of the ECHR. 
This approach, in addition to suffering from unnecessary pragmatism and 
inconsistency, is not without further risks. For instance, in a hypothetical 
situation similar to the one in Rahimi,150  if the State authorities proved that 
they had taken this principle into account in assessing the situation of a 
migrant child, the detention would not per se be contrary to the ECHR. In 
this case, the State would still need to satisfy the general test of detention as 
a measure of last resort,151 but the principle of best interests would be 
 
142  Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶¶ 37-39; Muskhadzhiyeva, App. No. 41442/07 
¶¶ 59-63 (affirming that this same detention center was not an appropriate venue for detention 
of children). 
143  Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶ 68. 
144  Id. ¶¶ 68-69 (finding a violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR) and ¶¶ 86-88 (finding a 
violation of Art. 5(1) of the ECHR). 
145  Elmi, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, ¶¶ 144-45. 
146  Id. ¶ 41. 
147  Id. ¶ 56. 
148  Id. ¶¶ 113-15, 146-48. 
149  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶¶ 107-08. 
150  Id. 
151  Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, ¶ 119 (establishing that detention should 
be seen as a measure of last resort for which no alternative is available). In this sense, the 
ECtHR’s approach is similar to the one of the CJEU according to which immigration detention 
should be used as a last resort measure only. See Case C-61/11/PPU, El Dridi, 2011 E.C.R. I-
03015, ¶ 34; Case C-329/11, Achughbabian v. Prefet du Val-de-Marne, 2011 E.C.R. I-12695, 
¶¶ 36-37; Case C-601/15/PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, ¶ 63, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=c-601/15 
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satisfied. Despite these risks, the recognition of migrant children’s composite 
vulnerability, when combined with the assessment of their best interests, 
could pave the way towards the imposition of greater obligations of care and 
protection upon States, which is the subject of the following section. 
IV. TOWARDS THE IMPOSITION OF ENHANCED STATE OBLIGATIONS? 
A. ECtHR: Emphasis on Positive Obligations 
The recognition of vulnerability of migrant children and the use of the 
principle of best interests can be accompanied by the identification of an 
important duty owed by States to provide care and protection to these 
children.152 It is important to understand whether by doing so, human rights 
courts are contributing to the creation of new categories of obligations to be 
imposed upon States. If this is not the case, it is crucial to investigate whether 
existing State obligations are being interpreted in an enhanced manner, and 
converted into a sort of super-obligations. 
The ECtHR puts forward a distinction between negative and positive 
obligations,153 which overlaps to some degree with the tripartite distinction 
of obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights found in the 
academic literature.154 Negative obligations entail that States should refrain 
from interfering in the exercise of rights, whereas positive obligations mean 
that States should adopt all measures necessary to safeguard the effective 
 
[https://perma.cc/3M9J-54RG]. See generally Ana Beduschi, Detention of Undocumented 
Immigrants and the Judicial Impact of the CJEU’s Decisions in France, 26 INT’L J. REFUGEE 
L. 333 (2014) (evaluating the impact of the decisions in El Dridi and Achughbabian vis-à-vis 
the requirement of use of detention as a last resort measure in the French legal system). 
152  See Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 55. 
153  See ALASTAIR R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
141 (2004). See generally Frédéric Sudre, Les Obligations Positives Dans la Jurisprudence 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme [REV. TRIM. DR. H.] 363 (1995). 
154  See Asbjørn Eide (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), The Right to Adequate 
Food as a Human Right, ¶¶ 66-69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987) 
(proposing a tripartite typology of State obligations in relation to respect, protection and 
fulfilment of human rights); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND US 
FOREIGN POLICY 52 (1980) (proposing the following typology of duties owed by States in 
relation to human rights: to avoid depriving individuals of rights, to protect individuals from 
deprivation, to aid the deprived); DE SCHUTTER, supra note 17, at 280 (providing a detailed 
summary of the different typologies of State obligations in international human rights law); 
Rolf Künnemann, A Coherent Approach to Human Rights, 17  HUM. RTS. Q. 323, 328 (1995) 
(arguing that States have the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the existential status of 
human beings, and how they are entitled to live under these human rights); Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), ¶ 
15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999). 
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respect of rights.155 
Positive obligations applicable to situations involving migrant children are 
similar to those already in place regarding any individual falling within the 
jurisdiction of a State party to the ECHR.156 There are no new positive 
obligations created specifically in the context of the protection of migrant 
children’s rights. The same positive obligations are applicable to cases 
involving any other categories of individuals, and this is particularly apparent 
in relation to Articles 3,157 5,158 and 8 of the ECHR.159 
 
155  See Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, ¶ 31 (1979); Airey 
v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, ¶ 32 (1979); JEAN-FRANÇOIS AKANDJI-
KOMBE, Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS NO. 7, 5 (2007). 
156  See Vaughan Lowe & Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335, 
338 (Malcolm D. Evans eds., 2d ed. 2006); Bruno Simma & Andreas Th. Müller, Exercise 
and Limits of Jurisdiction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 134, 135 
(James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012); Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-
Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 132 (2012). 
157  For the positive obligation to take all measures necessary to protect children from ill-
treatment, see A. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 100/1997/884/1096, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2699, ¶ 24 (1998) (finding that U.K. domestic law failed to provide adequate protection to a 
child beaten by his stepfather when the beating constituted inhuman or degrading punishment 
and was known by the authorities); Z. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, 2001-V Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1, ¶¶ 74-75 (2001) (finding a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR insofar as the State 
failed to take measures necessary to place vulnerable children into the Child Protection 
Register). For the procedural positive obligation to investigate cases of ill-treatment, see E. v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 33218/96, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 31, ¶ 100 (2002) (finding that local 
authorities failed to protect children from an abusive stepfather and emphasizing the lack of 
investigation, communication, and cooperation by the relevant authorities). 
158  See Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, ¶ 124, (1998). 
This case affirmed that States have the obligation to record details about the detention as 
“Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard 
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an 
arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.” Id. 
159  See X. v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 E.H.R.R. 235, ¶ 30 (1985) (finding a 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR insofar as the Dutch legislation imposed a procedural 
obstacle for the prosecution of the perpetrator of sexual assault against a sixteen-year-old 
mentally ill girl, who was unable to represent herself and who could not be represented by 
anyone else, including her parent, according to the Dutch legislation); Maire v. Portugal, App. 
No. 48206/99, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, ¶ 72 (2003) (“[T]he positive obligations that 
Article 8 of the Convention lays on the Contracting States in the matter of reuniting a parent 
with his or her children must be interpreted in the light of the Hague Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction . . . and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.”); Hansen v. Turkey, App. No. 36141/97, 39 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 18, ¶ 97 (2003) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly held that Article 8 includes a right for 
parents to have measures taken that will permit them to be reunited with their children and an 
obligation on the national authorities to take such action . . . .”). 
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An area of key interest relates to the application of Article 3 of the ECHR 
to the situation of migrant children. For this provision to be applicable, ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order to fall within the 
scope of Article 3.160 Interestingly, in decisions relating to migrant children, 
the ECtHR tends to use the vulnerability concept to analyze the requirement 
of minimum level of severity.161 This approach has been criticized on the 
basis that it purportedly leads to lowering the threshold for the application of 
Article 3, and does so in an inconsistent manner.162 On its face, the argument 
is appealing; however, it fails to convince for three main reasons. 
Firstly, as affirmed by the well-established ECtHR’s jurisprudence, all 
circumstances should be taken into account by the Court when deciding 
whether the level of severity of a treatment or punishment is of such relevance 
as to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the ECHR.163 The mention of “all 
circumstances” explicitly includes the potential victim’s age,164 and should 
also naturally include her particular situation of vulnerability. 
Secondly, it is clear that the assertion according to which all situations of 
vulnerability would automatically lead to the application of Article 3 of the 
ECHR is erroneous. Fortunately, this is not the ECtHR’s position. Indeed, 
the ECtHR’s methodology relates rather to in concreto examination of all 
circumstances relating to the potential victim’s situation. It acknowledges the 
existence of composite vulnerability, recognizing that several factors leading 
to vulnerability can exist at the same time and that it is precisely the 
confluence of these elements that gives rise to a specific form of 
vulnerability.165 
Thirdly, the argument that the ECtHR incorrectly emphasizes the 
protection of social rights of specific categories of individuals166 cannot be 
 
160  See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 162 (1978). 
This case established that the assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative and 
“depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical 
or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.” See 
id.; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 29 (1978); Soering v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, ¶ 100 (1989). 
161  Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 86. 
162  See Bossuyt, supra note 83, at 29-31 (arguing that the ECtHR has lowered the 
threshold of application of Article 3 of the ECHR when the case relates to asylum seekers). 
163  See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 162; Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, ¶ 100; Tyrer, 
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 29. 
164  See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 162; Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, ¶ 100; Tyrer, 
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 29. 
165  See supra Part II. 
166  See Bossuyt, supra note 83, at 31-32 (arguing that in its decisions in M.S.S. and 
Rahimi, the ECtHR transformed the prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment 
or punishment, which is a civil right that must be respected regardless of the available 
resources, into a social right requiring considerable expenditure). 
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accepted. Already in its seminal decision Airey v. Ireland, the ECtHR 
highlighted that whilst the ECHR “sets forth what are essentially civil and 
political rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic 
nature.”167 It concluded with the famous holding that there is no “water-tight 
division” separating these two categories of rights.168 Since then, the ECtHR 
has confirmed this holistic approach on many occasions.169 As the ECHR 
applies to everyone within the jurisdiction of a State party,170 nothing would 
justify using a different approach in relation to foreign individuals. In 
addition, in Rahimi, the patent failure of the State to provide material support 
for the applicant was in clear breach of the domestic legislation, which 
explicitly required the State to provide care and appoint a legal guardian to 
all unaccompanied migrant children within its jurisdiction.171 
Essentially, there is nothing intrinsically new in the ECtHR’s approach to 
the application of Article 3 of the ECHR to cases relating to migrant children. 
The Court is simply applying its well-established jurisprudence to a novel 
situation which, sadly, occurs with ever greater frequency in light of the 
ongoing migration crisis in Europe. Therefore, the ECtHR has not created 
new obligations for States in this case. 
Similarly, in the domain of Article 8 of the ECHR, considerations of the 
children’s best interests have always been a central element in decisions 
relating to nationals as opposed to foreign individuals. This is the case in 
decisions relating to parental authority and placement of children in foster 
 
167  Airey, App. No. 6289/73, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, ¶ 26. 
168  Id. 
169  See generally Lopez Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994) 
(regarding the pollution caused by a water treatment plant which was close to the applicant’s 
home); Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (2004) (regarding 
the State’s obligation to inform the inhabitants of a slum near a rubbish tip about the risks of 
living there); Budayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02, 
15343/02, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267 (2008) (regarding a mudslide which killed and injured 
the habitants of a village in Russia and the positive obligations of the State to take all 
appropriated measures to protect their lives). 
170  ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 1. 
171  Diatagma (2007:220) Prosarmogí tis Ellinikís Nomothesías pros tis diatáxeis tis 
Odigías 2003/9/EK tou Symvoulíou tis 27 is Ianouaríou 2003, schetiká me tis eláchistes 
apaitíseis gia tin ypodochí ton aitoúnton ásylo sta kráti méli [Presidential Decree Article 19(1) 
and (2)(a)  on the transposition into the Greek legislation of the Directive 2003/9/EC laying 
down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in Member States] Ephemeris 
Tes Kyverneseos Tes Hellenikes Demokratias [E.K.E.D.] 2007, A:251 (Greece). 
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care,172 determination of paternity,173 and adoption.174 
Accordingly, the main impact of the recognition of the migrant children’s 
vulnerability and application of the principle of best interests is the degree of 
the obligations imposed upon States by the ECtHR. The recognition of 
vulnerability operates as a magnifying glass,175 exposing a greater duty to 
protect and care owed by States in relation to vulnerable individuals. In 
relation to the protection of migrant children’s rights, State authorities have 
a significant obligation to take the best interests of the child into account.176 
However, this does not imply the creation of new obligations to be imposed 
upon States. In contrast, new obligations could be expected from States in the 
Inter-American system. 
B. IACtHR: Potential for Innovation 
Comparatively, in the Inter-American context, the IACtHR is generally 
more prone to innovation and willing to impose a wider variety of obligations 
upon States, as explained below.177 
For instance, the Inter-American Court has imposed novel responsibilities 
upon States in relation to their obligation to identify non-national children 
who require international protection within their jurisdiction.178 For instance, 
it held that States should provide training for professionals performing initial 
 
172  See Palau-Martinez v. France, App. No. 64927/01, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 303, ¶ 42 
(2003) (emphasizing the necessity for State authorities to take into account children’s “real 
interests” while deciding on parental authority and custody issues). 
173  See Mikulić v. Croatia, App. No. 53176/99, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, ¶ 65 (2002) 
(“[I]n determining an application to have paternity established, the courts are required to have 
regard to the basic principle of the child’s interests.”). 
174  See Fretté v. France, App. No. 36515/97, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 303, ¶ 42 (2002) 
(considering that the right to adopt is limited by considerations of best interests of the child); 
Loudoudi v. Belgium, App. No. 52265/10, ¶ 97 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
148672 [https://perma.cc/LX64-8ED2] (affirming that the best interests of the child is a 
component of the right to respect of family life and should be paramount to decisions of the 
domestic courts relating to adoption of children under the Islamic system of kafala). 
175  See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1079. 
176  See supra Part III. 
177  See LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 224 (Rosalind 
Greenstein trans., 2011) (arguing that the IACtHR’s approach to reparations is innovative and 
forward looking); Ana Beduschi, The Contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights to the Protection of Irregular Immigrants’ Rights: Opportunities and Challenges, 34 
REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 45, 63-65 (2015) (arguing that the IACtHR is at the forefront of an 
innovative approach to reparations in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants’ 
rights). 
178  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, operative ¶ 3. 
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assessments in age and gender sensitive related interviewing techniques.179 
Similarly, the IACtHR has imposed an obligation to guarantee that the 
administrative or judicial proceedings concerning the rights of migrant 
children are adapted to their needs and are accessible to them.180 It based the 
justification for such an obligation on the necessity to ensure that the best 
interests of the child is a paramount consideration in all the decisions 
adopted.181 Importantly, this obligation may entail significant changes to 
domestic laws and policies. It implies, for example, that decisions on 
migratory matters involving migrant children should not be delegated to non-
specialized officials,182 and that special attention should be paid to migrant 
children’s non-verbal forms of communication.183 
The IACtHR’s leeway in imposing such a variety of obligations upon 
States can be explained by the general mandate given to it by Articles 1(1)184 
and 2185 of the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”). Indeed, 
the IACtHR interprets these provisions as the basis for a general obligation 
of States to adapt their domestic legislation to the ACHR.186 
The recognition of migrant children’s vulnerability187 is equally crucial for 
the determination of the nature and degree of State obligations in the Inter-
American system. For instance, the IACtHR clearly established in its 
influential Advisory Opinion no. 21 that 
States must accord priority to a human rights-based approach, from a 
crosscut perspective that takes into consideration the rights of the child 
and, in particular, the protection and comprehensive development of the 
 
179  Id. ¶ 85. 
180  Id. operative ¶ 4. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. ¶ 121. 
183  Id. ¶ 122. 
184  American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
(“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full 
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, 
birth, or any other social condition.”). 
185  Id. art. 2 (“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 
1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, 
in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”). 
186  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 65. See Laurens 
Lavrysen, Positive Obligations in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 2 INT. AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 94, 96-97 (2014) (discussing the wide array of positive 
obligations recognised by the IACtHR). 
187  Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 71 (emphasizing 
the situation of additional vulnerability of migrant children). 
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child, which should have priority over any consideration of nationality 
or migratory status, in order to ensure the full exercise of their 
rights . . . .188 
Certainly, these obligations were introduced by the IACtHR in an advisory 
opinion, a non-binding interpretation of the law.189 Nevertheless, the 
Advisory Opinion OC-21 is definitely noteworthy. It comprehensively 
illustrates the IACtHR’s general views on the topic and forms the basis for 
the development of its decisions in the future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ECtHR’s understanding of the concept of vulnerability in cases 
relating to migrant children, although not exempt from criticism, can 
contribute to the strengthening of the protection of their rights. By developing 
a contextual analysis of migrant children’s composite vulnerability, the 
ECtHR has avoided the risk of excessive stigmatization of this category of 
individuals.190 We should welcome the Court’s emphasis on the 
complementarity between vulnerability and the principle of best interests of 
the child, given that it reinforces the need for special measures of 
protection.191 
Yet, the example of its Inter-American counterpart demonstrates that the 
European Court could indeed do more.192 It took the ECtHR until 2016193 to 
directly refer to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General 
Comment No. 6194 while integrating the principle of best interests from 
Article 3 of the CRC. Nonetheless, even the 2016 reference was not 
dispositive, as the principle of best interests was not even applied in the case 
 
188  Id. ¶ 18(2). 
189  Hugh Thirlway, Advisory Opinions, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008) (“An advisory opinion is a judicial 
opinion, most frequently given by a standing international tribunal . . . on a legal question 
which is frequently, but need not be, related to a current international dispute. In the case of 
standing tribunals, their statutes provide for such opinions to be given at the request of a 
defined class of international bodies rather than of States. An essential characteristic of 
advisory opinions is, as the term implies, that they constitute advice, ie [sic] they do not legally 
bind either the requesting entity or any other body or State to take any specific action pursuant 
to the opinion. In general, there may be, at most, an obligation on the requesting entity to 
regulate its conduct or its affairs taking due account of the view of the legal situation expressed 
in the opinion.”). 
190  See supra Part II. 
191  See supra Section III.A. 
192  Id. 
193  Elmi, App. Nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, ¶ 56. 
194  See generally Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 
5. 
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in question.195 
Hence, the ECtHR is considerably instrumental in its use of this principle. 
If, on the contrary, the ECtHR allowed the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child’s child-centered views on the justifications of migrant children 
detention196 to robustly penetrate the realm of the ECHR, it would bring 
much-needed consistency to the understanding of the principle of best 
interests in the specific context of ECHR rights and liberties. 
Despite its reserved approach in terms of detention, the ECtHR’s 
recognition of migrant children’s composite vulnerability and consideration 
of their best interests has contributed to the imposition of enhanced 
obligations upon States.197 The ECtHR’s approach is the most visible in 
relation to the existing positive obligations. Unlike the IACtHR, the ECtHR 
does not create new obligations in the field of the protection of migrant 
children’s rights.198 The ECtHR’s recognition of vulnerability only operates 
as a magnifying glass, exposing a greater duty to protect and care imposed 
upon States, which is further reinforced by the application of the principle of 
best interests of the child.199 
On balance, both the identification of their composite vulnerability, and 
recourse to the principle of best interests, embrace and foster the need for 
further protection of migrant children’s rights. In view of the current global 
migration crisis, and the growing number of unaccompanied or separated 
migrant children, a more substantial child-oriented approach to international 
migration is certainly needed. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence is slowly evolving 
in this direction. Notwithstanding, this process will still require a great dose 
of persistence and determination to achieve a more comprehensive level of 
protection. 
 
 
195  See supra Section III.B. 
196  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶¶ 61, 63. 
197  See supra Section IV.A. 
198  Id. 
199  Id. 
